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1. Introduction
The initial stage of reforms in Central and Eastern European economies was
accompanied by a sharp decline in economic activity, an increase in inflation rates and
significant fiscal problems. Large budget deficits resulted from a big drop in the tax base,
associated with a drop in real output which was unmatched by fiscal expenditure cuts. In
most Central and Eastern European countries large public sector deficits determined
monetary growth, inflation rates and seigniorage revenues in the beginning of the
transition period.
A number of authors consider seigniorage revenues as an important source of
government finance (see, e.g., Drazen, 1989; Bruni, Penati and Porta, 1989, Grilli, 1989,
and Gross, 1993). Recent research shows that the seigniorage in several Southern
European countries as a share of GDP varies between 2 and 4 percent (Horrendorf,
1997). The importance of seigniorage as a revenue instrument in Central and Eastern
European countries has been also frequently analyzed (see, for example, Oblath and
Valentinyi, 1994; Kotulan, 1995; Hochreiter, Rovelli and Winckler, 1996; Budina, 1997;
and Cukrowski and Janecki, 1998). The results indicate that the experiences in collecting
seigniorage revenue differ across countries. Hochreiter, Rovelli and Winckler (1996), for
example, study central bank seigniorage in five countries: Romania, Hungary, Czech
Republic, Austria and Germany. Their findings (base on opportunity cost and inflation
tax definitions of seigniorage)
1 indicate that central bank seigniorage in 1993 was about
30% of GDP in Romania (due to the high inflation rate), and 4% of GDP in Hungary
(due to the high ratio of central bank assets to GDP in Hungary). Seigniorage in the
Czech Republic was around 1% of GDP (similar to that of Austria and Germany). This
                                               
1 See Section 2.- 3 -
could suggest that revenues from the creation of money play very different budgetary
roles in Eastern European countries. However, as indicated by Klein and Neumann
(1990) and Neumann (1996), to properly compare seigniorage revenues in various
countries one has to take into account a number of country-specific features, requiring a
more detailed analysis of the mechanism underlying the seigniorage revenue creation
process.
This paper focuses exclusively on Czech National Bank seigniorage revenues in
the period 1993-1997. Following Neumann (1996), we define seigniorage in the broadest
possible sense as the sum of all revenues resulting from the monopoly power to issue
money. Unlike existing empirical studies we take into account the important fact that
seigniorage depends also on legal, institutional and operational details that are relevant
for the creation of base money in a country (see Klein and Neumann, 1990; and
Neumann, 1996). This approach not only allows proper estimation of the seigniorage
revenues in subsequent years, but also shows how the size of seigniorage revenues
should be computed for the purpose of inter-country comparisons.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss some issues
related to the economic understanding of the term ´seigniorage´; moreover, we present
alternative definitions, and the concept of total gross seigniorage and the sources of total
gross seigniorage. In the third section we consider the uses of total gross seigniorage. In
the fourth section we show the measurement framework, describe the data sources and
present empirical results. In the fifth section we discuss the results computed. Finally, the
last section contains the main conclusions.- 4 -
2. The Concept of Seigniorage
The concept of seigniorage can be defined in a few different ways. In the classical
theoretical literature (see e.g., Drazen, 1985) three basic definitions of seigniorage are
used. The first defines seigniorage as inflation tax (ph, where p is the inflation rate and h
denotes real high-powered money). The second defines seigniorage as opportunity cost
of holding money (ih, where i is nominal interest rate) - the private sector’s loss of
foregone interest revenue from holding non-interest bearing cash balances instead of
earning assets. The third – and the most general – defines seigniorage as total revenues
associated with money creation (mh+(r-n)a, where m is the nominal growth rate of high-
powered money; r-n is the difference between the real rate of interest and the population
growth rate; a is the real stock of interest earning government assets, a<h). It has been
shown (see Drazen, 1985) that the first two definitions are special cases of the last one.
As with most conceptual issues, there is no clear indication which definition of
seigniorage is the best.
 In the analysis which follows we adopt the concept of gross
seigniorage, proposed by Klein and Neumann, (1990) and Neumann (1996), which
encompasses all other concepts.
2 In particular, we define total gross seigniorage as the
real gross resource flow to the government sector associated with base money creation
(Neumann, 1996). Formally, we specify total gross seigniorage s as
p
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p
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s
M is monetary seigniorage defined as a change in base money stock M deflated
by the general price level p:
m
M
M
p
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M
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= = (2)
(m denotes real balances);
A
P and A
F denote a private sector debt and foreign debt, respectively;
   i
P and i
F stand for corresponding nominal interest rates;
   G denotes revenue from central bank’s operations.
Monetary seigniorage s
M measures the actual wealth transfer which the private
sector has to make in order to receive base money in the amount of M from the central
bank. The second term in expression (1) describes the flow of interest revenue on the
stock of non-government debt that the central bank bought in the past in exchange for
non-interest bearing base money (the debt service on the central bank’s stock of
government debt is not included here because it is merely an inside transaction between
the government and the central bank). The third term in expression (1) describes
seigniorage revenue from central bank’s operations.
3. The Distribution of Total Seigniorage
Most empirical literature presents a proxy for actual seigniorage flow to the
government based on two implicit assumptions: (1) the government receives the
seigniorage revenues regardless of the legal and institutional regulations governing the
relationship between the government and central bank; (2) the amount of seigniorage
revenue transferred to the government does not depend on the specific ways and means
in which the creation of seigniorage is induced by the central bank. This is a
simplification which does not take into account the cost of money production and the- 6 -
existence of the central bank in general. Note that the cost of the central bank could be
significant (e.g., Klein and Neumann (1990) show that in the period 1974-1987, about
16.9% of German monetary seigniorage was used to cover the Bundesbank´s operating
costs).
A more precise analysis presented by Neumann (1996) shows that total
seigniorage is used for covering the cost of money production and central bank operation
s
C, for net investment in non-government debt by the central bank s
NI, for replacement
investment to make up for the exchange rate induced loss of assets (in terms of domestic
currency)
3 s
RI, for budget finance s
G , and for the increase of the central bank capital (or
is transferred to the third parties) s
O. Thus,
O G RI NI C s s s s s s + + + + = , (3)
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C
Coin
 denotes the cost of coinage, and C
CB stands for the central bank’s
cost of printing notes and maintaining operations;
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F denote private sector debt and foreign debt, respectively;
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L  denotes a book loss (defined as a positive number), and  e  is an
exchange rate;
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RI equals zero (see Neumann,1996; for details).- 7 -
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A
G denotes government debt and R
G appropriated profit;
,
p
R
s
O
O = (8)
R
O  denotes profit transferred to the third parties or used for capital
accumulation.
Part of the seigniorage transferred to the central government budget s
G (specified
by expression (7)) is called  fiscal seigniorage  (see Klein and Neumann, 1990; and
Neumann, 1996). In general, there should be two additional terms in the numerator of
the expression (7): R
Coin – revenue from coinage (in the case where the government has
rights to issue coins as in Germany, for example); and T
B – taxes on central bank’s
property and income (when the central bank has to pay taxes on property and income as,
for instance, in Japan). In the case of the Czech Republic the government receives fiscal
seigniorage through two channels: (1) net borrowing from the central bank (
•
G A ), and
(2) appropriation of the central bank’s profit, net of interest payments on the central
bank’s stock of government debt (
G G G A i R - ). Thus, fiscal seigniorage is fully
determined by expression (7).
4. Empirical Analysis
The empirical analysis of sources and uses of seigniorage revenues presented in
this section is based on data from the central bank balance sheets and its statements of
income and expenditures and profit distribution (the main data sources are the Annual- 8 -
Reports of Czech National Bank).
4 The sample period is 1993-1997. All the data are
reported annually and denoted in the analysis which follows by subscript t. The Appendix
explains in detail how specific entries in the balance sheets and income statements are
used to obtain the data required to compute the components of total gross seigniorage
and its uses.
We begin with the distribution of the total gross seigniorage. The total
seigniorage st is the sum of the following sources:
A
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where the monetary seigniorage st
M is computed as
t
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seigniorage revenue from the stock of interest-earning foreign and domestic private
assets st
I is determined as
 
t
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where IRt and IEt  correspond to interest revenues and interest expenditures,
respectively;
and seigniorage revenue from central bank’s operations st
A  is computed as
t
t t A
t p
IR RE
s
-
= ,             (12)
where REt  denotes the total revenue of the central bank.
The total seigniorage st is allocated to the following uses:
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C
CB - costs of maintaining operations of central bank,
C
Co&Bn - costs of coinage and printing banknotes,
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where Pt denotes the total profit of the central bank in the period considered.
Investment seigniorage can be computed as a residual, i.e.,
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The data required for the computation of all sources and uses of total gross
seigniorage in the period 1993-1997 are presented in Table A.3.
In Table 1, the sources and uses of seigniorage for the overall sample period
1993-1997  are presented in Czech Crowns. All flows are expressed in 1993 prices.
The year by year developments of the total gross seigniorage and its sources as a
fraction of GDP are presented in Figure 1. The distribution of the total gross seigniorage
in subsequent years as a fraction of GDP is presented in Figure 2.- 10 -
Table 1.      Sources and Uses of Seigniorage in the Czech Republic
(1993 prices)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Billion of Czech Crowns
Total st
T 22,82 49,92 47,14 44,84 28,90
Sources
     Monetary st
M 16,70 40,12 35,53 45,76 -4,33
     Interest Revenues st
I 7,90 7,92 7,06 2,82 4,84
     Revenues from
CB operations
st
A -1,79 1,87 4,55 -3,74 28,39
Uses
     Costs st
C 2,57 1,95 1,66 2,17 5,72
     Net Investment st
NI 79,45 58,70 43,65 18,26
     Replacement st
RI -0,08 -2,23 3,07 -1,42
     Fiscal st
F -31,41 -10,99 -4,05 6,33
Percent of total
Sources
     Monetary st
M 73,2% 80,4% 75,4% 102,1% -15,0%
     Interest Revenues st
I 34,6% 15,9% 15,0% 6,3% 16,7%
     Revenues from
CB operations
st
A -7,8% 3,8% 9,7% -8,3% 98,2%
Uses
     Costs st
C 11,3% 3,9% 3,5% 4,9% 19,8%
        Net Investment st
NI 159,2% 124,5% 97,3% 63,2%
        Replacement st
RI -0,2% -4,7% 6,8% -4,9%
     Fiscal st
F -62,9% -23,3% -9,0% 21,9%- 11 -
Figure 1. Total gross seigniorage and its sources in the period 1993-1997 (as a percentage of GDP)
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Figure.2. Total gross seigniorage and its uses in the period 1994-1997 (as a percentage of GDP)
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A comparison of the conventional concept of monetary seigniorage with total
gross seigniorage and fiscal seigniorage shows that monetary seigniorage usually
understates total gains from money creation. Moreover, in general, it does not reflect the
scope of budget deficit financing through seigniorage revenues. Furthermore, contrary to
the common view that in most of Eastern and Central European countries, revenues from
money creation play a significant budgetary role, the figure shows that in the Czech
Republic, revenues from the creation of money have never been extensively used as a
tool for financing government expenditures.
5. Macroeconomic note
In the beginning of the nineties, Czechoslovakia and later the Czech Republic
implemented a successful macroeconomic program. The authorities managed to keep
inflation relatively low (immediately after the transformation towards a market economy,
in 1991, Czechoslovakia experienced around 57 percent inflation, which was reduced to
20 percent in 1993 and kept down below 10 percent in the years thereafter). Budget
deficits in the period 1993-1997 did not exceed 1% (actually till 1995 the government
budget was in surplus ￿ in 1993 the budget surplus was about 0.1%, in 1994 about
0.9% and in 1995 about 0.5%; for 1996 and 1997, the budget deficit was –0.1% and –
1% percent respectively) so there was no great pressure to use seigniorage revenues for
fiscal purposes. Moreover, in the considered period the government had significant
revenues from privatization. As the result, as shown in Figure 2, in the years 1994-1996
seigniorage was not used for government purposes (resources flowed from the
government to the central bank). In this period most of the seigniorage revenues ware
used for the investment in non-government debt. Note, however, that the value of the- 14 -
investment in non-government debt has been continuously decreasing starting from 7.7%
of GDP in 1994 to 1.7% in 1997.
In 1997, as the result of economic disturbances, a change in the previously
observed pattern of fiscal seigniorage development occured (this change is in line with
the development of the budget deficit of the Czech Republic)
5. We should note,
however, that in 1997 fiscal seigniorage was still much below 1% of GDP. It is worth
mentioning that an increase in fiscal seigniorage has been accompanied by a significant
decrease in the monetary base (strong monetary restrictions have been imposed in
response to the high current account deficit)
6 with a relatively small decline in the total
gross seigniorage. This shows explicitly that a decrease in the monetary base does not
automatically imply smaller seigniorage revenues for budget deficit financing.
The increase in the scope of the budget deficit financing accompanied by a
decrease in monetary base can be explained by the activities of the Czech National Bank
during the period of exchange market disturbances and the change of the exchange rate
regime (the first part of 1997). For 1997, Figure 1 and 2 show huge revenues from
central bank operations and more or less the same level of the central bank operation
costs as in the previous years. This suggests that in 1997 the CNB accumulated foreign
assets before devaluation and sold them just after devaluation with a big profit (the net
investment in non-government assets was still positive but rather modest). A large profit
from financial operations allowed the CNB to reduce the monetary base and at the same
time to increase the flow of resources to the budget, i.e., fiscal seigniorage (see Figure
2).
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To summarize the analysis above, one can say that an increase in the scope of
budget deficit financing can be achieved not only by an increase in the monetary base (as
it is suggested by the traditional approach to seigniorage) which could raise inflation, but
also by increasing central bank efficiency.
6.  Concluding Remarks
This paper has presented and applied new insights from seigniorage literature to
the problem of financing the budget deficit in the Czech Republic through seigniorage
revenues. In particular, contrary to other empirical studies, we have not relied on the
simple concept of monetary seigniorage which measures the flow of the additional
monetary base the government can issue, but instead we have used (1) a new concept of
total gross seigniorage which measures the total flow to the government sector and (2)
fiscal seigniorage which measures the portion of seigniorage received for budget
financing.
Our empirical analysis of sources of seigniorage revenues in the Czech Republic
for the period 1993-1997 has revealed that the monetary authorities’ interest earnings on
non-government debt (interest revenues) and revenues from the central bank’s
operations are important components of total seigniorage revenues, and therefore, the
conventional concept of monetary seigniorage does not always adequately measure the
total flow of seigniorage. In particular, the results show that an estimation of the total
seigniorage by monetary seigniorage usually understates the total flow of seigniorage
revenues. At the same time, the results indicate that monetary seigniorage should not be
used as a proxy for the total flow to the government sector since it  reflects fiscal
seigniorage only if investment seigniorage is close to zero, something that is usually not
the case in transition economies.- 16 -
Moreover, in contrast to the common belief that in most transition economies
revenues from money creation play a significant budgetary role, we found that in the
Czech Republic revenues from the creation of money have never been extensively used
as a tool for financing government expenditures. The average flow of seigniorage
revenues into the budget is of a similar scope as is usually the case in developed Western
European countries.
Finally, it is important to stress that the results presented in this paper imply a
weakening of the link between inflation and seigniorage. In particular, much like Klein
and Neumann (1990), we would like to emphasize that the increase in a monetary base
(and a country’s inflation rate) does not automatically imply higher fiscal seigniorage
revenues. Nor does the inverse necessarily hold, i.e., a decrease in a monetary base
(associated with a decrease in the rate of inflation) does not automatically imply smaller
seigniorage revenues for budget deficit financing. An increase in the scope of budget
deficit financing can be achieved by increasing the central bank’s efficiency instead of by
raising the rate of inflation.
7 However, an analysis of the efficiency of the legal
arrangements and operational procedures of the Czech National Bank has been left for
further research.
                                               
7 Klein and Neumann (1994) show that a central bank with a sufficient extent of operational
independence might be able to influence the amount of seigniorage acquired by the government even at
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Appendix.  Data Sources
The main sources of data used for the calculations of the total gross seigniorage
and its components are: (1) the Balance Sheet of the Czech National Bank and (2) the
Profit and Loss Statement of the Czech National Bank. The simplified forms of these
two documents (for 1997) are presented in Table A1 and Table A2 below. A short
description follows of how Table A3 (containing all the data used for the computation of
the total gross seigniorage and its components) is constructed.
Table A1.
Balance Sheet of the Czech National Bank
as of December 1997 (in billions of Czech Crowns)
                         Assets                        Liabilities
A.1 International Reserves 89.277 L.1 Monetary Base 344.264
   A.1.1       Gold 3.922    L.1.1      Currency in circulation 139.146
   A.1.2       IMF Quota 24.962    L.1.2      Bank Deposits 205.118
   A.1.3       Deposits at Foreign
      Monetary  Institutions
60.393 L.2 Foreign Deposits 49.075
A.2 Loans 181.278 L.3 Deposits of Customers 40.828
   A.2.1        Loans abroad
* 86.278 L.4 Government Deposits 26.038
 A.2.2        Loans to Domestic
       Monetary Institutions
76.021 L.5 CNB bonds 150.00
A.2.3        Loans to Customers 18.979 L.6 Capital 1.40
A.3 Securities 363.792 L.7 Other Liabilities 30.660
A.4 Other Assets  18.663 L.8 Net Income, 1997 10.745
Total 653.01 Total 653.01
*Loans abroad include financial papers in foreign currency and deposits in foreign currency.- 18 -
Table A2.   
Profit and Loss Statement of the Czech National Bank
as of December 1997 (in billions of Czech Crowns)
                   Revenues                  Expenditures
R.1 Interest Revenue 40.909 E.1 Interest Expenditures 34.065
R.2 Profit from Financial
Operations
*
39.611 E.2 Maintaining operations,
printing banknotes and
making coins
**
  5.767
R.3 Revenue from fees and taxes   0.552 E.2.1      Expenditures for
     printing money and
     minting coins
 0.366
E.2.2       Maintaining
      operations
  5.401
E.3 Creating Reserves for
Deposits
***
20.864
R.4 Profit for the Accounting
Period
10.745 E.4 Creating Other Reserves   8.626
* Profit from trading all kind of financial papers (treasury bills, bonds etc.).
** Maintaining operations, printing banknotes and making coins include: expenditures on employees,
wages and salaries, social and medical insurance, printing banknotes and making coins, expenditures
from property transfers, non-receivable loans from clients, and other maintenance expenditures.
***  Creating Reserves for Deposits include: legal reserves and insurance for classified loans, reserves for
financial papers (as described above), reserves for tangible and non-tangible property, reserves for loans,
reserves for given insurance, other reserves.
Tables similar to Table A1 and Table A2 for the period 1993-1996 were used to
obtain the data presented in Table A3.- 19 -
Table A3.
Data used for the computation of  the total gross seigniorage
and its main components (nominal values)
Year Pt C
Co&BN
C
CB G R
G
-i
G
A
G
A
G A
F IR-IE  e DM
1993 100.0 0.696 0.08 -1.785 1.509 9,56 13.71 7.9 17.64 16,7
1994 109.6 0.502 0.17 2.053 1.438 -24,88 60.73 8.69 17.75 44
1995 118.3 0.317 0.13 5.386 1.002 -37,89 158.8 8.36 18.52 42,06
1996 128.5 0.285 0.60 -4.806 -8.654 -43,1 164.3 3.62 18.06 58,83
1997 141.4 0.366 5.40 40.162 10.745 -34,14 122.5 6.84 18.28 -6,12
where
Pt  – the general price level (reported annually by the Czech Statistical Office);
C
Co&BN  – costs incurred by the Czech National Bank for printing bank notes and
minting coins, C
Coin+C
BN (in billions of Czech Crowns);
C
CB – costs for maintaining operations (in billions of Czech Crowns);
G – revenue from central bank’s operations (in billions of Czech Crowns),
R
G-i
GA
G – net profit distributed to the government (in billions of Czech Crowns);
A
G – government debt (in billions of Czech Crowns),
A
F – foreign debt held by the Czech National Bank, respectively (in billions of
Czech Crowns);
IR-IE  –  net interest revenues of the Czech National Bank (in billions of Czech
Crowns);
e –the exchange rate of the Czech currency with respect to the German Mark,
(expressed as units of Czech Crowns per one German Mark).
   DM ￿ change in the monetary base (in billions of Czech Crowns).
Sources:
C
Co&BN (cost of printing banknotes and making coins) is presented in the Profit
and Loss Statement of the Czech National Bank (see Table A2, item E2.1).
C
CB (costs of maintaining operations) is presented in the Profit and Loss
Statement of the Czech National Bank (see Table A2, item E2.2).- 20 -
G (revenue from the central bank’s operations) presented in the Profit and Loss
Statement of the Czech National Bank (see Table A2, items R2+R3).
R
G-i
GA
G (net profit distributed from the central bank to the government) is
reported in the Profit and Loss Statement of the Czech National Bank (see
Table A2, item R4).
A
G (government debt held by the Czech National Bank) is determined base on
internal data of the Czech National Bank (negative values, and negative
changes,  reflecting large government income from privatization).
A
F   (foreign debt held by the Czech National Bank) is determined as the
difference between  International Reserves (Table  A1, items
A.1.2+A.1.3+A.2.1) and Foreign Deposits (Table A1, item L.2).
IR-IE  (net interest revenues of the Czech National Bank) determined as the
difference between  Interest Revenues (Table  A2, item  R.1) and  Interest
Expenditures (Table A2, item E.1).
e (the exchange rate of the Czech currency with respect to the German Mark) is
reported by the Czech National Bank.
 DM (change in the monetary base) reported by the Czech National Bank.- 21 -
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